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Abstract
Macalester’s identity as a college is deeply rooted in its commitments to social justice,
activism, and multiculturalism. As such, it has a rich history of student social movements defined
by unique, decentralized networking structures forming out of the constraints of working in a
college environment. In terms of structure, what do successful Macalester social movement
organizations look like? I argue that Macalester social movement organizations form
concentrically nested structures and that these networks in concert with organizational tactics
lead to success or failure in terms of goal acquisition. I draw on the history of Macalester student
social movement organizations, highlighting four unique case studies in which students targeted
the administration hoping to change college policy: Expanded Educational Opportunities
protestors in the 1970s, the Dream Act Committee, Kick Wells Fargo off Campus, and Fossil
Free Macalester.
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Introduction to Macalester SSMOs
Woven proudly into the multicolored web of Macalester College’s history is the distinct,
central thread of the activist tradition. From the college’s more institutionalized commitments to
community service and global citizenship, to the tense, but proudly remembered civil rights and
anti-war protests of the 1960s and 1970s, for the most part these stories are made central to the
history of Macalester. Listening to the college’s podcast or attending major college events, to the
passing observer it might appear there is a zen harmony between the institution and the student
activists who call Macalester home. The organizing conditions at Macalester are complex and
challenging and the results of student protest are varied.
In September 1974, 21 Expanded Educational Opportunities (EEO) scholarship students
began the most infamous act of protest in Macalester College’s history. One morning, a group of
more than 20 students snuck into the college’s business offices at 77 Macalester Street, chained
the doors behind them, and began an occupation that would last 12 days. Their action—aimed at
saving the EEO scholarship, a scholarship to help fund students of color attending the
college—gained the attention of Twin Cities media, community organizers, and ultimately the
support of much of the student body and the college’s president. About 40 years later, activists
from Kick Wells Fargo Off Campus (KWOC) tried a similar tactic, occupying the administrative
offices in Weyerhaeuser Hall. Their goal was to see the college sever its ties with the bank in
solidarity with the victims of the 2008 housing crisis. Not only was their protest ultimately
unsuccessful, but it failed to gain the broad-based support of students and was scorned by
then-president, Brian Rosenberg. Following the action, the Office of Student Affairs heavily
sanctioned participants.
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Why did the 77 Mac protest gain traction while KWOC’s occupation fell totally flat,
when in scope and size, the protests are almost mirror images of each other? Separated by nearly
a half century, the two major occupations of college administrative buildings share many of the
same traits, yet the student social movements (SSMOs) that initiated them wielded totally
different levels of power and influence. The differences in outcomes may be due to a number of
the variables at play when students protest: the tactics used, the political opportunity.
However, in this project, I focused on SSMO networks, hypothesizing that success in
terms of goal acquisition has been directly tied to organization structure. My initial estimation
led me to hypothesize that large, horizontally structured organizations were most likely to
succeed in the Macalester organizing environment. However further study led me to refute this
original claim. I drew on four case studies of historic Macalester SSMOs to show that while most
had no formal hierarchy or line of succession, successful organizations adopted unique,
semi-horizontal structures based around a central but often unlabeled leadership team. My model
builds on scholarship of Networked Social Movements (NSMs), but goes beyond the limitations
of the internet as primary organizing ground to map similar hierarchical structures on formal
organizations. At the same time, I argue that when it comes to success, the harmony between
activist networks and the tactics an SSMO uses is ultimately the most effective determinant of
success in terms of goal acquisition. The model I develop—a concentric circle model—serves as
a lens through which to view the efficacy of student organizing at Macalester.

The Language
Because my four case studies are uniquely situated in the Macalester, higher education
context, a brief review of how I personally engage the language of social movement scholarship
is essential. First, social movement organization is a widely engaged term that became central to
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the discipline in the 1970s to describe the professionalization of social movements (Johnson 8).
Here, I use the definition given by Hank Johnson in his 2014 textbook What is a Social
Movement:
“These are groups varying in their size, complexity, and formal structure that are
organized by citizens to pursue their claims when politicians are unresponsive or when
certain issues seem especially compelling,” (8).
This broad framing is particularly useful at Macalester, where “activism” has in some cases
become a deeply-held moral virtue rather than an enacted identity. Many students define
themselves as activists for a host of reasons. But this definition also provides a useful limit, when
we substitute the language of governance for the language of higher education. Rather than
citizens: students. Rather than politicians: administrators.
I also engage the vocabulary of social movement success. What “success” means is
disputed among my interviewees, some of whom defined success as being well-prepared to be
active participants in social movements and organizations beyond Macalester. Others revelled in
the social bonds and confidence formed among co-organizers. Still others favored
consciousness-raising as the priority. In this paper, however, when I discuss “success,” I refer to
policy outcomes that accomplish the stated mission of the organization. This results-based
definition of success originates with William Gamson’s The Strategy of Social Protest (1975). It
centers the response of the opposing force or the target of the protests, placing movements on a
spectrum of success and failure based on the response they are able to elicit from their intended
target (Saeed 2009). This works well for my paper, as I seek to understand how SSMO networks
contribute directly to the outcomes of a social movement’s work. Of course there are flaws with
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this definition of success. It does not capture the long-term impact of policy wins, nor the effects
of consciousness-raising on students, supporters, and movement participants.
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The Case Studies
My research is based on the four Macalester SSMOs: the Expanded Educational
Opportunities protests, Kick Wells Fargo Off Campus, the Dream Act Committee, and Fossil
Free Macalester. I chose to focus on movements that targeted Macalester decision
makers—usually the administration or the board of trustees—with the goal of changing college
policy. I made this limiting decision to keep the organizations included in my study as directly
comparable as possible. From students involved outside of school in activist organizations, to
chapters of state or national organizations on campus, to individual students advocating for
change at the school, to students protesting on campus against outside parties (e.g., guest
speakers), the spectrum of student activism at Macalester is vast.
Between 2020 and 2021, I conducted 16 interviews: three with administrators and staff,
two with faculty, and 11 with former student activists. The interviews were conducted over Zoom
and lasted between 45 and 100 minutes. While I used a single list of questions, the conversations
were loosely structured to allow participants to elaborate on aspects of the movements that were
central to their interests or prominent in their memories. Each participant had the option to either
contribute confidentially or include their name in the project. Eleven participants chose to
include their names, while five elected to remain unnamed. I drew on all the interviews to
develop my analysis and build my history of the SSMOs.
The following movement summaries are compiled from both archival resources and oral
recollections of the SSMOs.
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EEO: Defending scholarships for students of color
In 1974, facing terrible economic plight as a result of a mismanaged budget, the loss of
financial life-raft donor DeWitt Wallace, and a smaller-than-expected enrollment, Macalester
chose to cut its Expanded Educational Opportunities budget to the tune of $73,000. (Gearino
1998b, Havens 1974)) The college, under then-president Andrew Flemming’s leadership and in
consultation with the students of the Black Liberation Affairs Committee (BLAC), had founded
the EEO program in 1968 as a way to recruit and retain more low-income students of color,
particularly Black students. The program brought 75 students to the nearly all-white school in the
fall of 1969 and by the time Flemming resigned just two years later, the school had around 200
enrolled students of color (Gearino 1998b).1 Cuts would mean eliminating funds for the Black
House2 and the termination of a counselor who had been hired specifically to support Hispanic
students (Wesslund 1974a). Students, primarily the EEO beneficiaries themselves, immediately
rallied in the program’s defense.
After a relatively unimpactful picketing and some short-lived negotiations with the
college, EEO decided to take a page out of the book of classic and historical protest tactics. and
make some truly radical action. On September 13, 21 angry, exhausted students approached the
locked entryway of the college business offices at 77 Macalester Street. At 5 a.m., an individual,
whose identity remains a secret, unlocked the doors and let them in.3 Once inside, the students
chained the doors behind them. Nobody, save for one negotiator, came or went for the next 12
days. The occupiers to their plan, who had alerted some members of the community in advance,
enjoyed the support and even protection of much of the student body. Students from the Latinx,
1

Both from the EEO and from increased recruitment of students of color outside of the program (Gearino 1998b).
Then located at 1626 Portland, the Black House was just one of Macalesters numerous cultural houses at the time.
3
A detail from an interview with the lead negotiator, I will have to readminister the interview, but this is a fun detail
I’m sure he’ll talk to me about it again.
2

8

Indigenous and Black communities on campus brought the occupiers meals, which they passed
through a window on the first floor. Crowds of non-EEO students, sometimes numbering in the
hundreds, picketed outside of the occupied hall to protect it from Macalester Security and St.
Paul Police (Hannas and Wesslund 1974). According to one occupier I interviewed, members of
the football team waited on-call to defend the protest.
The protest consisted of four main parties. First, were the building occupants: all EEO
students including one negotiator who came and went from the building via the first floor
window. The second, were other EEO students and supporters involved in the protest happening
outside the building. These “outsiders” were based in the Black House and communicated back
and forth with the occupants by walkie-talkie (Hannas and Wesslund 1974). All decisions about
the negotiations passed through a chain of command. The outsiders would vote and then pass
their decision onto the occupants to make the final
call (Hannas and Wesslund 1974). The third was
everybody present for negotiations
with the college, 17 people total
including new President James
Robinson and Vice President Charles
McLarnan, EEO negotiators, and
three members of the faculty. The
final group consisted of supporters
not associated directly with the
negotiating team, many of them
students who lived in the dorms.
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These bystanders picketed in front of the building every day during the occupation. There was
also a massive local news presence in front of the building. The protest drew more and more
media attention every day, and occupants gave interviews through cracked windows. Local
activists came to shake occupiers’ hands.
With six specific demands, first and foremost a six-year guarantee of the EEO program
and not the least of which amnesty for their protest, occupying EEO students and their allies led
a fierce week of negotiations which ultimately ended in the acquiescence of the college. With the
aid of a third party negotiator, Carleton professor Earl Craig, by Tuesday, September 24, the
agreement had reached its final form, with the occupiers winning a five year guarantee of the
EEO program, as well as a number of their other demands: a larger counseling staff for Puerto
Rican and Mexican-American students, a reduction of the EEO budget cuts from the previous
year, and the restoration of a secretarial position in the EEO office, to name a few (Hannas
1974). Later that night, the occupants gathered their supplies, unchained the doors, and
relinquished 77 Mac. In the street outside, a huge crowd of onlookers and news media greeted
the occupants with blinding TV camera lights and cheering. Students left the building with their
fists raised, descending into the fray of friends and classmates (Hannas 1974).
The victory, though glorious, was short lived. Negotiators who had hammered a deal with
Robinson, didn’t anticipate the more ruthless bent of the board of trustees, who, at their October
meeting, initiated a year-long investigation into the EEO program. By spring, they ultimately
rebuked the terms of the negotiation, dooming the EEO to a dismal 10 year slide into obscurity.
Defining whether or not this movement was successful is tricky. The SSMO didn't achieve the
policy goals it had won in name, but it was successful in its targeting of members of the
Macalester administration, Robinson in particular. I define this group as largely successful, but
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only in the short-term. In my investigation, I tried to understand what Macalester SSMOs could
do to secure longer-term protections.

The Dream Act Committee: Improving resources for undocumented
students
The Dream Act Committee formed during the 2012-2013 academic year as a subset of
Adelante!4, an identity collective for Latina and Latino students at Macalester. Each year
Adelante was committing its time and resources to educational and advocacy campaigns on a
specific social justice issue. In 2010 and 2011, the group advocated for farm workers rights. The
following year, under the coleadership of Jocelyne Cardona and another student, had decided that
it would take on advocacy for undocumented students during the 2011-2012 academic year.
Organizers, including Cardona, attended Social Responsibility Committee (SRC) meetings,
questioning what Macalester was already doing for undocumented students. Given the college’s
institutional commitments to internationalism and multiculturalism, student activists working on
the issue believed that the college should be doing more to support undocumented students. In
spring of 2012, it began a campaign asking for the college to offer its public institutional support
for the passage of the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.
The issue was immediately popular among administrators including Rosenberg, who had
already written a personal letter to Congress in February urging the passage of the Act
(Westrasmus 2012). After a year of educational campaigns, the push for the college to support
the DREAM Act culminated in the annual Latinx Week celebration at the end of March, in which
Adelante organized a DREAM Act photo mural, a speech from the week’s keynote Speaker
4

Adelante! stylizes its name with an exclamation mark, which I drop from here on out for clarity in punctuation.
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Gaby Pacheco on the history and faces of the DREAM Act, as well as a silent demonstration on
Bateman Plaza in support of the Act’s passage (Macalester College 2013). While these public
events made the organization’s goals obvious to the students, Cardona and other students
presented to the SRC, making the case for the college to take up the issue on an institutional
level. At the end of that year the SRC and President Brian Rosenberg both cosigned Macalester’s
support of the DREAM Act.

Despite the victory, the work continued in the 2012-2013 academic year with the
formation of the Dream Act Committee. It was a subset of Adelante, with students who were
particularly interested in action and advocacy work for undocumented students. However, while
the targeted work at Macalester ramped up, coverage of the group diminished significantly, in
part due to organizers’ desire to focus on negotiation over protest but also due to the personal
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nature of the issue. The committee participants worked one on one with college administrators to
improve access in a number of ways adding resources to the college’s admissions website as well
as hosting a specific event for undocumented students and their families to visit the college at the
end of 2014. Ultimately, the group was successful and the year after Cardona, who had been
involved in the group since she chose dream act advocacy is focus and back in 2011, said that a
year after she graduated she heard the college admitted two undocumented students. The group
was successful, winning all the demands it set out to achieve, but was never well-known, with
just a handful of students continuously involved in the advocacy.

KWOC: Occupy comes to campus
During the wave of protests inspired by Occupy Wall Street, activists across America
donned the mantle of the movement of the 99 percent and its tactics to target institutions
symbolic of economic inequality and corporate greed. In Minnesota, this took the shape of the
Occupy Homes, a movement to occupy foreclosed on but still lived in. Several Macalester
students were active in this Twin Cities-based movement and went on to organize at Macalester
around the same issues, pressuring the college to cut ties with Wells Fargo, a bank that had been
identified as heavily involved in and responsible for many of the foreclosures in the state of
Minnesota.
At the time the college used Wells Fargo for its purchasing cards which students and staff
used to make external purchases with college accounts. The movement had two waves. The first,
Occupy Macalester (Thomas 2011), formed in the Fall of 2011 and failed to gain traction. They
hosted one major event the following April, “Faces of Foreclosure,” (Baker 2012) which brought
a number of speakers to campus to discuss the personal effects foreclosures were having on city

13

residents. During that event, Occupy Macalester introduced their first petition to the college.
Later that week, they presented it to then-college President Brian Rosenberg. From the
beginning, Macalester senior staff expressed deep reservations about the movement. The week of
the “Faces of Foreclosure'' event, Rosenberg wrote in an email to The Mac Weekly that he was
“very, very cautious about boycotts.”5 When the Occupy Macalester students presented him with
the petition, he ultimately turned them down.6 It set the tone for escalating tensions between the
anti-Wells Fargo protesters and the institution. One of Occupy Macalester’s more controversial
actions forever tainted the face of the occupy movement on campus when students sent fake
eviction notices to dormitory doors, an action that was widely seen as inappropriate and
specifically caused pain for students who actually had been evicted from their houses.7
Rebranding coming into the fall of 2012 as Kick Wells Fargo Off Campus,8 the group
maintained its confrontational tactics, and still struggled to bring students on board. It hosted a
number of letter writing and smaller protest events throughout late 2012 and early 2013,
including organizing, including working with the Minnesota Property Union (SEIU 26) to host
an event for the Minnesotans for a Fair Economy Week of Action (Silverman 2013). But the
group's most infamous action and the most significant to the course of the movement was its
occupation of the administrative offices in Weyerhaeuser Hall in the spring of 2013.

5

This quote comes from The Mac Weekly’s coverage of Faces of Foreclosure. In the article, the quote is abbreviated,
and doesn’t contain a further explanation from Rosenberg on his stance.
6
I was unable to locate a Mac Weekly article or other coverage explicitly stating this, but because the movement
continued and Macalester maintained its relationship with Wells Fargo throughout, we can assume this petition was
denied.
7
This faux pas was identified as such by both KWOC participants, some of whom weren’t part of the Occupy
Macalester iteration of the movement, as well as by their organizing contemporaries. One of my interviewees from
another SSMO had been impacted by eviction in their personal life, and identified this action as an especial misstep
that kept them from involvement in an organization whose stated values rang true with their personal experience.
8
The name is a reference to the national “Kick Wall Street off Campus” campaign, which also had roots in the
Occupy movement.
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The occupation was preceded by the college’s official refusal to cut the contract with
Wells Fargo which came in mid-April (Wheaton 2013). Vice President for Administration and
Finance David Wheaton and Assistant Vice President for Finance Kate Walker wrote a letter
later published in The Mac Weekly stating that after investigation on the college’s part, it could
not verify some of KWOC’s claims (including that Wells Fargo was the largest forecloser in the
state), and that there were no effective alternatives to Wells Fargo for purchasing card services.
KWOC responded in The Mac Weekly denouncing the decision, and then on the morning of
Monday, April 22, it began.
Fourteen students marched into Weyerhaeuser Hall, up the stairs and to the small waiting
room outside of the college president’s office (Ryan 2013a). There, carrying signs, they sat down
and began to chant. After it became clear KWOC had no intention of leaving, administrators and
staff, including Rosenberg, abandoned their offices, ceding the level to the occupiers.9 But before
they left completely, staff locked all the bathroom doors and sealed access to the administrative
wing. Six hours into the sit-in, it was obvious that the students would be unable to hold the
president’s office without access to basic amenities, so the group relocated to the main lobby of
Weyerhaeuser Hall late that afternoon. There the group remained for three days, sleeping on the
floor of the Weyerhaeuser boardroom and protesting throughout the day. Feeling that the
occupation couldn’t maintain steam for much longer, KWOC activists moved to escalate on
Thursday morning, blocking all entrances to the building, linking arms to prevent employees and
visitors from accessing it. Negotiators on behalf of the college soon acquiesced to the group’s
demands to meet with Rosenberg, and KWOC ceded the building to meet with the president on
Friday.

9

Assistant to the President Cynthia Hendricks and a number of security officers remained. On the lower levels of the
buildings, employees continued work as usual.
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In the meeting, Rosenberg flatly denied the requests to cut the contract, citing KWOC’s
extreme tactics and his support for Wheaton and Walker’s research (Ryan 2013b). When the
meeting ended, the KWOC representatives left the building to address a small rally of supporters
on Bateman Plaza. The group reaffirmed its intent to continue its campaign. But with finals on
the horizon, time for KWOC had run out, and now that it had abandoned Weyerhaeuser it had
also given up its leverage.10 After the summer of 2013,11 KWOC never returned to full form.
Though they planned to continue (Coombs 2013) at the start of the fall semester, the group
performed no other major actions.
After the occupation, participating students were heavily reprimanded by the
administration with some being removed from leadership positions—including on Macalester
College Student Government (MCSG)—and all but eliminating KWOC’s organizing powers.
The group was no longer allowed to use official college meeting places (e.g., the campus center)
and it was officially disbanded as a student organization. This group was relatively small, with
roughly 20 active participants throughout 2012-2013. Outside support waxed and waned with
some actions garnering alumni support and the occupation co-signed by SMOs outside the
college,12 and other events shunned by the student body — organizers said some students would
walk by the protests and flash Wells Fargo bank cards at participants. Interviewees identified the
struggle for student support as a central deficiency with the SSMO. This group was entirely
unsuccessful, achieving none of its stated goals and folding almost immediately after the
occupation and repercussions.
10

From an interview with a KWOC leader.
According to a Mac Weekly article from the time, Macalester joined the rest of the ACTC in changing the terms of
its contract with Wells Fargo that summer (Coombs 2013). I haven’t been able to find further details on this
negotiation either in The Mac Weekly or online more generally. Hopefully, I’ll be able to find some more information
on this through interviews or by contacting school officials.
12
Interviewees reported a group of Occupy activists from Portland, Oregon sent the occupiers pizza on one night of
their stay in Weyerhaeuser Hall.
11
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Fossil Free Macalester: A decade of divestment activism
At Macalester’s commencement ceremony in 2019, audience members were treated to a
spectacular show of student solidarity: a sea of orange Xs marking the back of hundreds of
students’ mortarboards. It was the work of divestment organization Fossil Free Macalester
(FFM), a group founded seven years prior. The Xs represented the group’s demand for the
college to place a moratorium on all private partnerships with fossil fuel companies. But the
FFM founded in fall 2012 looked and sounded very different from the popular student
organization of 2019. Originally, FFM aimed to lobby the college to divest completely from
fossil fuels, meaning that any endowment funds invested in oil and gas companies would be
relocated to other investments. It brought its first formal proposal before the Social
Responsibility Committee in early 2015, but the committee elected to give no recommendation
on their work, rendering the proposal dead in the water before President Brian Rosenberg or the
board of trustees could consider it.
According to FFM core member Hannah Shumway, when she came into the organization
as a first-year that fall, the organization was in the process of considering all of its original values
and strategies. That semester would be spent restructuring and reimagining FFM, as it
collaborated with other climate justice groups in the Twin Cities and studied other college
divestment movements for inspiration. In need of a tighter organization, FFM transitioned from a
flat leadership structure to a Swarthmore-inspired model, with some core members responsible
for leading the group and a much larger base that could participate as much or as little as they
wanted. They began to meet more with college administrators, including Rosenberg, Wheaton
and Chief Investment Officer Gary Martin, directly asking how the group could be more
persuasive to college decision makers.
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At one of these meetings, FFM had their lightbulb moment. It was spring 2016, one year
after its first proposal crashed and burned. While presenting on the division of the endowment,
Martin and Wheaton revealed that Macalester had private partnerships with “energy” companies.
Immediately FFM changed its ask to target these partnerships, worth about $40 million of the
college’s endowment. Whereas its original demand would have required the college to divest its
mutual funds, which were blind investments controlled by the markets, the new FFM proposal
just asked Macalester to place a moratorium on these partnerships.
Over the course of the next two years, FFM split its attention. Outwardly, they continued
to demonstrate outside Board meetings, poll the student body on its feelings on divestment, and
host “Fossil Fools Day” every April 1st. The group hosted near constant educational campaigns,
making tabling and town hall events central to its organizing strategy in an effort to ensure the
student body understood the ask and its potential impact despite the complex economic subject
matter. In the fall of 2016, MCSG officially chartered FFM as a student organization. Inwardly,
organizers wrote a new proposal, based on continued meetings with the administration and
coordination with the national divestment movement. This made the group’s relationship with
the administration both contentious and negotiation-based in turn, with organizers constantly
considering the appropriate balance between discussions and protests.
In spring 2018, FFM presented its research to the SRC once again (Catlin 2018). That
April, the committee recommended the proposal to the board of trustees, who didn’t pick up the
document until their meeting in February 2019. Unfortunately for organizers, the February
retreat stalled when the Board’s investment committee advised against divestment. After
speaking with allies on the board, FFM decided to reinforce how popular their proposal was
among Macalester students. In April 2019, they hosted a non-binding MCSG referendum asking
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the student body to vote on the moratorium. About 1,000 students (almost half of all Macalester
students) responded to the referendum, voting 96 percent in favor of the measure (Katz 2019).
Nonetheless, following Rosenberg’s announcement that he would step down from the
presidency in 2020, the Board passed on reconsidering the proposal. When they picked it up at
their October meeting later that year, it became the climax of the FFM campaign. In a final
demonstration of student-body support, about 200 students participated in a sit-in in
Weyerhaeuser Hall during the board meeting (Asher and Catlin 2019). All silent, many holding
signs making their case for divestment, the students lined the lobby outside the Weyerhaeuser
Boardroom while trustees passed them on their way into the deliberations. Several hours later,
Chair of the board of trustees Jerry Crawford ’71 left the Boardroom and, in a small meeting
room on the second floor of Weyerhaeuser, announced to a small group of FFM leaders and
several Mac Weekly writers that the Board had elected to accept the Fossil Free Mac proposal.
For the most part. The board included a caveat that in the future, it could invest in fossil fuels
should that investment result in a net reduction of carbon emissions.
The decision left FFM reeling (Cooke 2019). Organizer Sasha Lewis-Norelle said that
while the group came to a consensus that while the win was a huge achievement, the caveat was
difficult to ignore. Leaving it in their proposal without question felt untrue to the original FFM’s
intent. However, in December, following several weeks of soul-searching, Fossil Free Mac
officially disbanded (Timar-Wilcox and Weber 2019). Partially, because the effort to change the
decision further would likely require years of organizing and also that the group’s efforts were
better located elsewhere. Many in the FFM core contingent, for example, refocused their energy
into Macalester’s chapter of the Sunrise Movement as well as the fight against the Enbridge Line
3 pipeline construction in northern Minnesota. For the purposes of this research, I determined
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that FFM was largely successful, if not entirely so. The group enjoyed fruitful negotiations with
the administration and the board of trustees and received a decision that was extremely close to
its own proposal with one small compromise for an instance so seemingly rare that it may never
come to pass.
However, partway through this research process, FFM resurrected itself when
Lews-Norelle discovered Macalester had direct investments in Enbridge (Denehy and
Timar-Wilcox 2021a). Many of the organizers who had been central in the final days of FFM’s
campaign in 2019 rejoined the effort, using a deep institutional knowledge of the college’s
investments to help aid in demands for divestment from Enbridge in solidarity with the
Indigenous-led protests to stop pipeline construction in northern Minnesota (Denehy and
Timar-Wilcox 2021b). This research focuses solely on the first seven years of the campaign in an
effort to use retrospective analysis to study the entire arc of a SSMO. As of writing, the conflict
between the new iteration of FFM and the administration is ongoing (Denehy and Timar-Wilcox
2021c).
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The Concentric Circles Model
Macalester student social movement organizations (SSMOs) almost always adopt
flexible, horizontal structures and group-based democratic decision-making tactics. These
movements are technically leaderless, as they frequently do not have elected representatives. Yet
most operate in an impermanent hierarchy based on commitment.

Figure 1: Concentric Circles Model of Organizing.
At the center, are the most vocal, most frequent SSMO participants: the core. They may
lead specific projects or initiatives within the organization or act as representatives to the
administration. Often upperclassmen, the members of the core are strategists and vessels of
institutional knowledge. In the next layer, participants are frequent meeting attendees and vocal
advocates for the SSMO. They may be underclassmen poised to become core members once they
gain more experience, former core participants who have taken a step back, or any participant
21

restricted in the time they can give to the organization. Moving a layer outward, we reach the
supporters. This underappreciated group13 is essential to movement credibility and long-term
viability. They may attend larger protests, sign petitions, or publicly voice their support on social
media, in The Mac Weekly, or otherwise. The final and most amorphous group are the
sympathizers. They have heard of the SSMO’s campaign and support its core values, but have
not identified themselves as supporters due to a lack of information on the issue, a distaste for the
SSMO’s tactics, or some other barrier to entry. When targeted with educational campaigns,
sympathizers may become supporters or even SSMO participants. Individuals may move
between layers of an organization, into or out of more active roles. Moving outward from the
core, each layer becomes less defined, with more exchange between levels. When each layer is a
part of the SSMO’s overall strategy, it can play a significant role in goal acquisition.
The concentric circles model I developed to summarize the recurring structures in
Macalester SSMOs belongs to a lineage of models to describe decentralized SMOs dating back
to anarchist cells in late 19th and early 20th century in Europe. Sidney Tarrow (2011) writes that
these groups tended to work outside the lines of traditional party politics and prioritize creating
cooperatives in a bottom-up structure (125). Decentralized, anarchist movements, were often
tactically extreme and militant in comparison to their institutionally organized counterparts —
Tarrow (2011) calls that second branch of SMOs the Social Democratic model or the “state
within a state” (124). Both extremes, very decentralized and very centralized movement
organizations, have their drawbacks: the former being disorganized and in some cases sectarian
and extremist (Tarrow 2011, 126), the latter prone to bureaucratic tunnel-vision and a lack of
creativity (Tarrow 2011, 124).

13

Many of my interviewees identified a lack of student support as detrimental to their organization or an outright
tactical failure as a result of incomplete, ineffective, or nonexistent education campaigns.
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The Social Democratic model of highly-organized and hierarchical SMOs was popular
throughout the U.S. in the 20th century: think the American Civil Liberties Union, the National
Organization of Women, and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as prolific and
influential examples. Decentralized groups, meanwhile, were less common and certainly less
popular in the first half of the century. But the nation’s most pressing social struggles — Black
liberation, LGBT+ rights, anti-imperialism — ultimately demanded contemporary solutions. So,
to meet the moment, SMOs built new, hybrid structures (Tarrow 2011, 128). Beginning with the
Black Panther Party, a new crop of radical American SMOs emerged in the 1960s and 1970s,
including the Weather Underground, the Young Lords, and the Gay Liberation Front. These
movements were not entirely without structure. They had regular meetings and national
strategies, and sometimes had organizational hierarchies. But they were not bound to the
traditional, policy-based advocacy of their Social Democratic peers, instead opting for
contentious, extra-institutional, and even extra-legal tactics focused on deconstructing
institutions of power. These groups also allowed for permeable membership structures, allowing
“local trust networks to be built into national organizations and [providing] the ‘free spaces’ in
which ordinary citizens could take initiatives that more centralized organizations could not have
mounted on their own” (Tarrow 130).
But while these new-wave decentralized organizations are a much closer relative to the
Macalester SSMOs than their pure anarchist ancestors, they aren’t quite the same. The
Macalester SSMOs in this study are not chapters of larger organizations, though they may
borrow language or strategies from national groups. KWOC participants, for example, cited
United Students Against Sweatshops organizing manuals as a source of inspiration. The SSMOs
I studied operated autonomously and were focused on achieving a policy goal within the
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Macalester context. That is, they were organizing at Macalester to change Macalester. The vast
majority of their members and their targets were Macalester community members. In addition to
being relatively small when compared to national decentralized SMOs, Macalester SSMOs are
relatively horizontal. So, while the hybrid model developed by the Black Panther Party and
others certainly paved the way, studying Macalester SSMOs requires a different framework.
Structurally, the movements at the college more closely resemble the “leaderless”14 movements
that gained prominence in the early 2010s following Occupy Wall Street in 2011. These include
Occupy, the Movement for Black Lives, and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong.
In this section, I show how Macalester SSMOs have adopted a concentric structure in
organizing, evaluate the potential benefits of adopting this structure, and draw a distinction
between my definition and explanation of Macalester SSMO structures and existing scholarship
on horizontal social movements, which focuses on the ideal and label of leaderlessness as well as
the influence of the internet on these social movement structures.

The Core: Leaders of the Leaderless
There is significant disagreement among scholars about
whether so-called leaderless movements truly exist
(Nikiporets-Takigawa 2017). Generally, we can trace the
philosophy of horizontality in SMOs to certain radical groups from
the 1960s, such as the Youth International Party, though the
strategies of these movements now seem best suited to the internet
age (Nikiporets-Takigawa 8).
14

The meaning of leaderlessness is hotly debated among social movement scholars, and I will begin to parse through
their arguments in the following section as I discuss leadership structures at Macalester.
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The label of leaderlessness emerged somewhat separately from the philosophy of
horizontal SMO structures. Before the age of the ubiquitous internet, leaderlessness was
theorized to describe radical terror organizations. The person who popularized and championed
the idea of leaderlessness in social struggle was Louis Beam (“Leaderless Resistance” 1992), a
KKK member who proposed the tactic as a method of state resistance to be “employed by those
who love our [white] race, culture, and heritage” (Beam 2). Beam’s disturbing and overtly white
supremacist essay essentially created the idea of “leaderless resistance,” but over time this label
was repurposed as a means of describing any group engaging in acts of political violence without
an explicit hierarchichy— for example, the most radical elements of the environmental
movement (Joosse 351). While Beam saw leaderlessness as a means to evade governmental
suppression and avoid organizational infiltration (Beam 2-3), Joosse (2007) added that leaderless
movements also allowed for greater “ideological diversity” (Joosse 352). Post-Occupy, the tone
changed even more. Leaderlessness became separated from terrorism and violent tactics15 and
entered the popular consciousness as a strategy of mass mobilization (Gautney 2011).
Many prominent skeptics of leaderlessness locate the phenomenon specifically in the
movements of the 2010s, especially Occupy (Boler et al. 2014, Decreus et al. 2014,
Nikiporets-Takigawa 2017, Western 2014). Rejecting the label “leaderless,” scholars have named
a species of movements specifically to define contemporary, internet-based, horizontal social
movements: Networked Social Movements (NSMs). Defining this particular brand of leadership
as “horizontal,” “spontaneous,” and “autonomous” (Nikiporets-Takigawa 19), scholars trace the
formation of these leadership structures to content creation. Those who take advantage of the
internet to voice their opinions and produce consistent content tend to become influential and
15

Leaderlessness as a means of mass protest outside of the context of terrorism/political violence was already
forming, for example at the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle in 1999. However, per my research,
Occupy marked a major shift in the work of scholars studying the phenomenon of leaderlessness.
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gain the power to control their followers outside the bubble of their internet presence as well:
“Followers listen to the leaders, who channel the masses’ anger into offline demonstrations,”
(Nikiporets-Takigawa 12). Essentially, individuals who are willing to step up, mobilize others,
and produce content become de facto leaders. Further distinguished by a high turnover rate and a
voluntary sorting process between leaders and followers, NSMs share similarities with
Macalester SSMOs.16 Simon Western (2014) narrows down this brand of leadership into terms
that transcend internet-based organizing. He names this example of leadership as “Autonomist
Leadership,” and claims it thrives in contemporary social movements and NSMs specifically.
Autonomist Leadership, which Western characterizes nearly identically to Nikiporets-Takigawa,
is “a specific form of anti-hierarchical, informal and distributed leadership that is distinctive to
emancipatory social movements” (Western 685) identified by “spontaneity, autonomy, mutuality,
affect and networks” (Western 685). Western writes that this nontraditional leadership style has
been a key strength, not only because of its flexibility, but also because “the lack of traditional
individual leaders and power elites make Autonomist-led movements exceptionally difficult for
their opponents to contain or control (689).
Nikiporets-Takigawa and Western thus argue that truly leaderless movements simply do
not exist, but critiques of leaderlessness go deeper. Some scholars argue the label itself is
damaging and discrediting to contemporary popular social movements. Barbara Ramsey, for
example, argues that while the Movement for Black Lives is often lauded as leaderless, that
definition does not accurately reflect the profound structures of group leadership, accountability,
and democratic authority that are the foundation of organizations like Black Youth Project 100,
Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, and Black Lives Matter (Ramsey 2015). Ascribing
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That said, Macalester SSMO’s are not primarily organized online. Though groups took advantage of internet tools
— KWOC and FFM members recalled using Facebook and Google Drive — they still relied on in-person meetings.
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leaderlessness and thus public ownership onto a group can also silence marginalized voices who
are often at the center of justice organizing. For example, #BlackLivesMatter co-creator Alicia
Garza has spoken out against the misappropriation and theft of the hashtag she helped to develop
— people who willfully use the phrase to their own ends, often against the intended purpose.
#AllLivesMatter is perhaps the most famous example. She writes that, “Straight men,
unintentionally or intentionally, have taken the work of queer Black women and erased our
contributions” (Garza 2014).
I tend to agree with this wide-ranging body of skeptics. In the case of Macalester, calling
the college’s SSMOs leaderless is not entirely accurate. While none of the Macalester SSMOs I
studied elected official leaders, the core of an organization was often foundational to its success
and maneuverability. While the core may be porous, perhaps only defined by the participants
who have more time to commit to the movement, this group does much of the heavy lifting in
many SSMOs.
Fossil Free Macalester, a divestment organization active in its first iteration from 2012
until 2019, inspired the naming of the “Core” group in my concentric circles model. Explicitly
defining a “core” team and “general” members, the group subdivided itself in order to improve
the SSMO’s workflow. In its handbook on student organizing, FFM notes that core members
who were able to facilitate meetings and tackle menial tasks created “efficiency,” allowing
“general” participants to take part in the movement and minimizing competition for their “time,
energy, and commitment” (Fossil Free Macalester 7). For FFM, while the core group was
completely accessible, with core member meetings open to whoever wanted to join, it was still a
clear leadership team. It is the only group I studied which used these labels to name certain
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sectors of its participants, whereas other groups adopted similar structures of varying sizes
without ever labeling the different segments of the network.
When Adelante 17 decided to take on advocacy for undocumented students in 2011-2012,
it formed a task force separate from the primary body of the group. The Dream Act Committee
was smaller and made up of people who wanted to spend more time in action-based organizing.
Though the majority of Dream Act Committee members were Adelante members, according to
participants, Adelante held separate meetings to allow the normal work of the organization to
continue.
“Initially, we would just check in at meetings, but I think at the end, we just kind of
ended up just being on our own, just for the sake of not taking up too much space,”
Dream Act Committee participant Jocelyne Cardona ’14 said.
In the case of the Dream Act Committee, it was wholly focused on strategizing, building
relationships with administrators, and undertaking educational efforts. It separated itself from
Adelante to preserve the larger group’s purpose as an identity collective. Sometimes, within the
core even more minute power structures form. Within the Dream Act Committee Cardona often
facilitated meetings, but she emphasized that beyond some logistical responsibilities, the
committee had a flat, democratic structure.
“I was facilitating meetings and things like that, but we were all figuring it out together.
Because it was all so new, and everyone has different strengths — we had a phenomenal
committee… I think the diversity in our strengths is what allowed us to constantly be
offering new ideas and collaborate in such a way that got us to that end result,” Cardona
said.

17

A student organization focused on “increasing awareness and appreciation of U.S. Latina/o, Chicana/o and Latin
American culture, politics and society.”
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The importance of this “core” method of leadership to SSMOs at Macalester is clearly
displayed in movement longevity. No SSMO was entirely without a core group of organizers:
whether formally or informally defined. Scholars who argue against leaderlessness claim that
leadership forms naturally, whether a group ascribes to norms of hierarchical structures or not
(Nikiporets-Takigawa 12). This makes it difficult to directly analyze whether a movement
without a core would survive. But the evidence of my review of Macalester SSMOs, all of which
had core leadership, would suggest not.
This style of leadership emerges as a consequence of the organizing environment at
Macalester College, defined by its rapid student turnover and academic years segmented by
breaks and periods of intense demands in the classroom. Acknowledging the impact of the
environment on SSMO structures distinguishes my model from other scholar’s explanations of
horizontal organizations. Western (2014), particularly,18 argues there is a specific and
psychological barrier preventing the leaders of “leaderless” movements from identifying
themselves as such. His two-fold argument is that first, emancipatory social movements always
view leadership as “hierarchical and authoritarian” and second that activists make “strong
affective investments in the term ‘leaderless’” (Western 689). Western believes this is at least
partially why movement organizations have Autonomist Leadership—a desire to maintain the
image and ethics of leaderlessness.
At Macalester, this is simply not the case. Members of the “core” group of organizers
regularly identified themselves as such. FFM is the best example of this, having explicitly
identified their group of leaders as part of their organizing strategy. The Dream Act Committee is
another example of this self-dividing phenomenon. These nonhierarchical leadership structures
instead form as a practical solution to the problem of cultivating sustainable leadership in an
18

But also Nikiporets-Takigawa (2017) and Decreus et al. (2014).

29

academic institution. It’s clear that leadership is a part of Macalester SSMO strategies, even as
these groups purposefully adopt relatively horizontal organizational structures. I argue that
instead, the college environment itself — characterized by rigorous classwork, the academic
calendar, and constant turnover in the student body — is the reason this type of leadership
structure emerges again and again. All three of these conditions mean that the calendar for
organizing is limited as well as organizers’ capacity to participate. For example, finals, a
demanding class schedule, study abroad, winter and summer breaks, and of course, graduation,
all regularly pull central members of SSMOs away from organizing work.
Flexible leadership is essential if a group is going to outlast a year of contention. If the
core group of an SSMO is allowed to graduate without sufficient training-in of younger
participants, then the movement may die out. Both KWOC and EEO members noted this as a
distinct factor in their SSMOs conclusions. Neither group was able to mobilize for more than one
year. KWOC organizer Luke Mielke noted this as an ongoing problem in his generation of
student activists, even as they went on to work on future issues like adjunct faculty unionization
and the Income Inequality Commission.
“It felt like a really strong — maybe it wasn’t a big group of people — but like a
close-knit structure,” Mileke said. “It’s pretty much the same people in these groups.
Which was not great in hindsight. It created a volatile arrangement.”
Meanwhile, groups with highly flexible leadership, outlasted several generations of students. In
these cases, the core organizing group was explicitly addressed and defined by the group. Again,
FFM’s “core” was self-defined, open to new members of the group to join. This explicit system
of defining leadership made it easier for these groups to pass the torch to the next generation.
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Hannah Shumway joined the movement sometime during her first year and graduated before
FFM’s work was finished.
When a group is able to sustain a multi-year campaign, flexible leadership can be a key
resource in the form of returning alumni. FFM in particular—in part because it was a
long-lasting movement, spanning seven years—enjoyed the support and institutional knowledge
of its core alumni. Hannah Shumway, who herself graduated before the end of FFM’s campaign
and provided advice and support afterward, recalled the significance of alumni participation to
the SSMO.
“I think it’s important to have that — those conversations, that continuity to help you
understand where the movement has come from and share those lessons learned in a way
that I think some folks tried to do with the Fossil Free Mac Handbook they put together. I
think that sharing of knowledge became very important to us, those of us who worked on
this. And as we went forward, we found it more and more important,” Shumway said.
In sum, the core of a Macalester SSMO is a voluntary, heavily-committed, subgroup
responsible for organizational strategy and key to the maintenance of the organization over time.
Core members often tackle logistics, facilitate meetings, interface with administrators, and
develop movement tactics and strategies. While there are no elected or official leaders, the core
is the gravitational center of an SSMO, around which the subsequent layers of the movement
orbit. If active effort is not invested in maintaining the core and recruiting new talent, burnout
and eventual failure become likely.
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Participants: The movement backbone
Those involved in the organization without the ability or desire to
take on a leadership role are participants. Participants may attend
meetings, protest actions, or otherwise engage in the work of the SSMO,
but they do not occupy positions of authority. This group exists because a
core leadership team emerges. It contains the remainder of active
movement participants. Where the core group forms naturally through a
process of volunteering and often reflects the amount of time core
members commit to the organization, the selection and filtering of
participant members varies widely among Macalester SSMOs depending
on their recruitment strategies.
There are a number of theories on how horizontal organizations like Macalester SSMOs
form when there are no stated barriers to entry.19 If a group is truly horizontal, then anybody
could join. However, this is almost never the case, and there is a constant undertow, an ebb and
flow of pressures to join the organization and pressures to leave the organization. These are
social forces which maintain the integrity of the SMO as a functioning, decision-making unit.
Finding the balance of these forces is imperative, and it's different for every SMO as they create
a participant base that suits their goals and tactics.
First, the flow: an SMO needs participants to function, but every group uses its
participants differently. At Macalester, the recruitment process is relatively straightforward.
Either you are a part of the group by default (as was the case in the 77 Mac protests, when EEO

19

The one barrier to entry which always exists in the sphere of organizing at Macalester is time. In order to join any
organization, you must have the time to do so. I focus on the next level of processing: pulling desirable participants
in and keeping undesirable participants out.
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students championed their own cause) or the participant signed up for a student organization or
identity collective (as was the case of the rest of the SSMOs studied here). But to keep a steady
stream of new participants coming to meetings, SSMOs must work to ensure certain
environmental standards are met. Hirsch (2009) lays out a number of steps on the path to
cultivating commitment among SSMO participants. Student groups, he writes, must focus on
consciousness-raising, collective empowerment, polarization, and group decision making in
order to garner the commitment of a base of movement participants.
Two SSMOs made an active effort to constantly recruit new participants: FFM and
KWOC. They did this to completely opposite effects. Educational efforts (consciousness raising
campaigns, Hirsch might call them) are common among Macalester SSMOs. Fossil Free
Macalester made teach-ins a regular part of their organizing playbook. Recruiting new movement
participants was constantly on the mind for organizers.
“I think it was, I mean, if not the number one priority then a joint number one priority. I
think we prioritized it as much as we possibly could because we knew if we didn’t have
people of all class years invested in doing the work, we didn’t have people from across
campus, across majors, the totality of Macalester doing the work, then it wasn’t going to
be as good or as credible to the administration.”
While KWOC wanted a broad participant base, it struggled to attract people to events and
provoked outwardly negative responses to certain rallies and recruitment techniques, for example
using a party-like atmosphere to draw people to its cause.
“Macalester students do typically take themselves incredibly seriously and I think were
kind of pissed off by us trying to use balloons to make a point,” I think our flashier
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actions — so the balloons, the thing [an event] with the bounce house — I don’t think
they were good ideas. I think they’d work in other contexts.”
Then, the ebb: how an SMO that claims to be horizontal in structure keeps unwanted or
incompatible participants from joining. Ashuri & Bar-Ilan (2015) argue that even flat
organizations employ a “validation” process, of a particular participant’s identity, social
awareness, and commitment to the movement. They find that this process happens via “diffuse,
small-scale interactions among members,” that “[feed] back into the status hierarchy of
members, enhancing the ability of high-status agents to regulate access to and participation in the
organization,” (1423). Essentially, secure members of an SMO will unofficially vet potential
participants to ensure they are a match for the group’s material goals and organizational ethos.
While no Macalester SSMO openly admitted to limiting participantship, some groups erected
subtle barriers which kept its group relatively small, and close to the core.

This could be the intent of a SSMO. For example, the Dream Act Committee kept a small
group working on the project on purpose — citing the safety of the undocumented students they
advocated for. The group still formed on a volunteer basis, but according to SSMO members, the
majority came from the original group of Adelante students, and few outsiders were informed
about the work of the committee.
“Knowing that the kinds of things we wanted, and that level of sensitivity attached to it,
where understanding that the kind of public awareness is not something that can
necessarily work towards our advantage on a larger scale,” Dream Act Committee
member Wayne Lee said.
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In addition, because this group chose non-confrontational, negotiation based tactics, there was
less need for organizational bulk — no major protest on the Great Lawn or in Weyerhaeuser Hall
they needed to fill with people. The approach The Dream Act Committee took was persuasion,
and a large, intimidating group could have actually been detrimental to that goal.
Other groups don’t necessarily seek to limit participation. Instead, they create ideological
blockades. Ashuri & Bar-Ilan (2015) called this the process social awareness validation. This
happens at all SSMOs to a certain degree, but the more specific and more radical the central
beliefs of the group are, the more this could pose a threat to cultivating movement participants.
KWOC, despite trying to find more participants among the Macalester community, struck out.
They also happened to have a very firm ideological stance that could have served as a turn-off to
some potentially interested participants.
“The line between social formations and organizational formations is really blurry,”
organizer Celeste Robinson said. “That was a big barrier. I think a lot of people didn’t
want to be branded as activists, which we for sure got, and chose to do. We were like,
‘we’re the activists’, people don’t want, necessarily, for that to be their identity starting
right off in college.”
Individuals who were only participants and not core organizers are not represented in my
sample of interviewees. That said, because leadership is flexible in Macalester SSMOs, many
core members were once participants or became participants when they had to take a step back
from the movement.
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Supporters & Sympathizers: Does Size Influence Social Movement
Success?
Supporters and sympathizers are not part of the SSMO itself, but
often wind up playing a key role in an organization’s long-term strategy.
The difference between the two groups is vocality. Supporters can be
mobilized for particular actions, they might sign a petition or share
information on social media. Supporters can be turned into participants.
Sympathizers, then, are not vocal supporters of the SSMO, but could be
converted to supporters. They take interest in the group, perhaps passively,
perhaps they’ve toyed with the idea of joining or have some stake in the
group’s actions. Sympathizers, however, must be turned into supporters
before they can be mobilized. I’ve combined them for this analysis
because the line between these groups is perhaps the most porous and hard
to define.
There are abundant reasons why an SSMO might want to maintain a large supporter and
sympathizer base. Zald and Ash (1966) proposed that the size of the organizational support base
and the popularity of the organization’s goals directly affect the long-term viability of an SSMO
(332). Further research supports this proposition. For one, size enables larger and often by
association more contentious tactics. As Hirsch (2009) puts it, “If large numbers are willing to
sacrifice themselves for the movement, the chances for success seem greater,” (95). The
appearance of a crowd can be incredibly powerful. While the largeness of a movement hasn’t
been directly correlated to achieving policy goals, it has been correlated with attracting the
attention and time of those in power (Johnson 2008). That is well-demonstrated by the EEO
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protests, which attracted the attention of administrators to negotiate and extracted a desired
outcome from the president at the time, but ultimately failed to build sustainable success.
The potential influence of a broad base of supporters was not lost on Macalester SSMOs
nor the administrators they targeted — who noted that broad student support was of considerable
interest to the decisionmakers when it came to considering proposals and demands. In the
following quote, former president Brian Rosenberg highlights a 2019 FFM protest, in which
supporters of divestment wore Xs on their graduation caps. This showing didn’t solely include
members of FFM, but hundreds of students who represented popularity of the issue.
“It really, really, really caught the attention of the trustees,” Rosenberg said. “Just sitting
there up on stage and seeing this sea of students, and seeing just the sheer number come
across with that symbol was a really powerful way of communicating how widespread
the support for some sort of action was.”
Wheaton echoed a similar point, speaking generally about the persuasiveness of the SSMOs he
had interacted with over his years at the college.
“If there’s a request of the institution to take institutional action, then it can be more
successful if there is wide support for the action in the community — the community
could be faculty, it could be staff, it could be students, it could be alumni,” Wheaton said.
“Because if the institution is going to take action in the name of the institution, then it
seems reasonable for the institutional to say, ‘our whole community cares about this, not
perhaps one much smaller segment of it, but the community cares about it.’”
KWOC demonstrates this theory, high participation as a predictor of success, by demonstrating
the inverse: that smaller, less popular organizations are less stable long-term. For KWOC, losing
its wider base hurt, especially because they chose radical, contentious tactics. These things
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happened in tandem: radical
protest tactics from the initial
days of the movement turned
students away from supporting
the cause and without broad
support, the group struggled to
legitimize itself or the intensity
of its actions.

“I think there were some things that we did that helped get students on our side and there
were other things we did that and there were other things we did that made students not
want to get on our side and those were not necessarily related to the things we thought as
organizers were most important for cause visibility,” one KWOC organizer said. “Tabling
in the basement of the campus center was the thing that students were like: ‘Oh, you guys
are doing this? We’ve been telling you to do this, this is what we wanted you to do, just
table down here calmly.’ Whereas protest, they didn’t like. We took that feedback and we
understood it, but we weren’t going to become the type of group that started only tabling
instead of protesting.”
The size of an SSMO is a useful frame to analyze the successes and failures of SSMOs at
Macalester. It may explain why despite the tactical similarities between KWOC and the EEO
protesters, the EEO protesters made much more progress with the college, gaining the
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concession of the president to their demands before the ultimate rejection of the board of
trustees.20 The base of support for the 77 Mac occupation was huge and vocal from the earliest
days of the occupation. From public demonstrations outside of the building throughout the
course of the occupation, to numerous editorials in support of the movement in The Mac Weekly,
to the outspoken support of local civil rights activists, the EEO protesters had one of the most
visible supporter bases of any of the SSMOs I studied. While just about half of students
supported the occupation openly, the people in the community who did were visible and even
involved in the negotiation process. These relationships, which were built up before the
occupation took place, helped to both bolster the spirits of the organizers, but also legitimize
their actions.
“I think the support that we’d built —that was support we’d built before we thought
about going in the building,” Melvin Collins, the lead negotiator for the EEO protesters
said. “And then, we had those relationships outside of school, including other student
organizations at Hamline, Augsburg, University of Minnesota, and that type of thing.”
KWOC was also thoroughly embedded in the community outside of Macalester through the
Occupy Homes movement, but at the end of the day operated more tangentially in their protests
against the college, and ultimately didn’t have nearly as much visible and vocal support as their
EEO counterparts.
FFM, an organization with slightly less contentious protest actions also benefited from a
broad supporter and sympathizer network. Regularly garnering hundreds of signatures on their
divestment petitions, collecting community feedback on Macalester’s fossil fuel investments, and
providing students with relatively easy ways to present their support for the cause it’s undeniable
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Referring back to Johnson (2008), larger movements may get more “agenda-setting” (969) privileges, even if it’s
not correlated to successful policy outcomes.
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that FFM cast a larger shadow than its stature. One particularly salient example of FFM’s
engagement with its supporter base saw the SSMO design Facebook profile picture filters
expressing divestment support — something that got high engagement from the student body.

“We were constantly trying to do events, do little things here and there to bring folks in,”
Shumway said.
However, my most significant finding disproved the general rule of organizing and my
hypothesis that SSMO size contributed significantly to the potential success of an organization.
One of the most objectively successful movements, the Dream Act Committee, had relatively
few participants. Organizers recalled there being ten or twelve people on the committee at its
largest. There are a couple possible ways to explain this deviation from my initial expectations
and the prevailing literature. Perhaps having a smaller or more central group made this SSMO
even more flexible and mobile. Perhaps the administration responded better to smaller
movements and was more likely to acquiesce to their demands because there was less of a
perceived threat in a smaller group. In the next section, I explore my preferred explanation and
offer a reevaluation of my initial hypothesis: that movement size in conjunction with other
protest tactics ultimately are the strongest determinant of success and persuasiveness.
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Networks as an Organizing Strategy
Organizing an SSMO involves a precarious tightrope walk in deciding when and how to
apply pressure to the movement target. SMO tactics are often a complex blend of contention and
persuasion, and research shows that finding the right balance of these actions can be critical
when it comes to achieving the desired goal of the organization (Feinberg et al. 2020, Fishman
and Everson 2016). If an organization chooses an “extreme” or highly-contentious action, they
are more likely to be perceived by the public and their target as immoral and thus, not credible
(Feinberg et al. 2020). I found this confirmed in my research both by administrators, who were
the target of my SSMO case studies, and in the reactions of the student body as perceived by my
interviewees. Two high-profile representatives of Macalester’s administration identified an
SSMO’s tactics as one of if not the chief determinant of whether a movement would be able to
successfully negotiate a
solution with the administration
or whether they would instead
fail. Vice President for
Administration and Finance
David Wheaton made a direct
comparison between the
KWOC occupation and the
sit-in FFM performed at the end
of its campaign, a show of several hundred
students camped silently outside the Weyerhaeuser
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Boardroom while the board of trustees debated whether to place a moratorium on fossil fuel
investments.
“Not to say there that sometimes more dramatic tactics may be felt to be the thing that
works, but at least at Mac in my time, the more dramatic tactic of blocking the
administration building hurt the cause and the respectful way the students did their sit-in
with the board I think helped their cause,” Wheaton said.
However, I argue that it is tactics in conjunction with networks that shape how decision makers
and other observers perceive the impact of a demand or action. This is supported by research that
indicates that political alignment will likely determine the evaluated validity of a given protest
action (Feinberg et al. 2020). Part of the measure of the credibility of protest at Macalester is
directly tied to the quantity of individuals willing to participate in and thus validate both the
action and the demand. It is when these two things are in harmony that the ideal outcomes begin
to manifest even when actions are contentious and when SSMOs immediately defy the
administration.
While KWOC touched on a live wire of the zeitgeist by using the language of the Occupy
protests, participants and organizers acknowledged that a deficit in support for their most
contentious act hurt their long-term prospects. According to organizer Luke Mielke, although
KWOC gathered hundreds of student signatures on petitions, they were unable to generate
widespread support for the occupation:
“I don’t think there was enough students informed about what we were doing and we
overestimated student support going into our sit-in and then we were trying to use a very
aggressive tactic to then an overhead lack of support,” Mielke said.
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A manifestation of this balance between contentious tactic and widespread support was
the EEO protest. In occupying the offices at 77 Mac for nearly two weeks, EEO students marked
the outermost limit on the spectrum of contentiousness at Macalester. Yet they ultimately
achieved their goal during negotiations, the administration acquiescing to their central demand, a
six-year guarantee for the EEO program. While tactically, the EEO occupation may appear
comparable to KWOC’s, both involving multi-day occupations of administrative buildings, the
KWOC protesters came up empty-handed. My case studies suggest that the contentiousness of a
protest likely needs to be proportional to the volume of support it enjoys from the student body.
If an SSMO can convince the student body to care about an issue—no small feat—then that
larger group can influence administration decisions. In the case of the EEO, there exists a pretty
clear measurement of its popularity. About a week into the occupation of 77 Mac, The Mac
Weekly conducted a survey of the issues at play among a representative sample of the student
body21. It found the 48 percent supported the occupation and about 12 percent remained
undecided with the rest opposing (Light 1974). There was also highly visible support of the
protest in daily picketing outside of 77 Mac and numerous letters to the editor published in The
Mac Weekly over the course of the occupation. A significant number of students opposed the
protest (nearly 40 percent) but most supported it, and that’s what’s important. While there is no
immediate polling of KWOC’s popularity, anecdotal evidence would suggest a much lower rate
of engagement among students writ large. There were comparatively few statements issued in
The Mac Weekly by supporting students and no evidence of picketing or other external
expressions of widespread student backing. Rallies during the course of the protest — including
a performance by renowned local hip hop artist Brother Ali — drew crowds (Ryan 2013). This
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suggests that one major difference between the two SSMOs and perhaps a determining factor in
their ultimate success was networks. Networks build a capacity for contention.
Smaller SSMOs can succeed at Macalester, but only in conjunction with relatively
low-contention actions. For example, the Dream Act Committee focused primarily on direct
negotiations with the administration, and chose not to raise the profile of the group and its work
very far beyond the 10 or 1222 individuals immediately involved in the negotiations. I believe
that the focus on negotiation and the tight central group together resonated with the serious tone
the Dream Act Committee used to convey its goals.
“Choosing to work with them [the administrators], alongside them, again, it just made
sense,” Cardona said. “It made sense because the issue makes sense. It’s like how can you
tell me you’re not going to do this when there’s nothing to say no about.”
This resonance deeply affected the administrators who interacted with this group. It’s not that
other SSMOs at Macalester organized around subjects that weren’t pressing—evictions, racial
justice, climate change—it’s that the Dream Act Committee best operationalized their message
for persuasion, to convince the administrators considering the proposal that it was an essential
one.
“The issue of undocumented students at Macalester is never going to involve hundreds of
students, it’s always going to involve small numbers,” Rosenberg said. “But for those
small numbers of students it’s their life. It is an issue that defines their life, and it’s
intensely personal and intensely emotional… It doesn’t require a lot of people because of
its sheer intensity.”
Using the language of Snow and Benford (1988), I would describe this concert of
negotiation-based strategy, small SSMO footprint, and the intensity of the organization’s
22
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message as frame resonance. Frames assign impact to an issue, identifying the problem and
who’s to blame for it, defining what should be done about the problem, and explaining why
people should care about it. The impact of these frames is all the more salient or resonant when
they ring true to the internal belief system of an organization and to the context in which it is
working. In the case of the Dream Act Committee, the small network it used helped build
resonance to its actions. The small network helped convey the privacy of the issue, and echoed
the impact the administrator’s actions could have on individual undocumented students.
Removing the negotiations from the greater student body context lent weight and intensity to the
Dream Act Committee’s demands. It also demonstrated that internally, the group had respect for
the sensitivity of the subject and knew that large, public actions might not be appropriate given
that undocumented students could be put in danger by increased attention. Meanwhile, KWOC
organized around the subject of eviction, an intensely personal and private issue, but failed to
effectively convey the importance of its request and draw the line between its demands, its
organizing strategies, and the desired impact. Its diagnosis: Wells Fargo is making an outsized
contribution to the eviction crisis, its prescription: Macalester should terminate its relationship
with Wells Fargo. However, KWOC’s explanation and messaging to students and decision
makers alike were out of harmony, leaving the group relatively small and limited to those who
understood the issue implicitly. The group further failed to convey the gravity of its request by its
tactics which were overshadowed by its unpopularity. Who is organizing and why has an
incredible impact on the outcome of a movement, and networks are a vital tool for organizers to
help build movement credibility.
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Structured for Success
In sum, my research upended my initial hypothesis that movement size and horizontality
would predict movement success. While my hypothesis was grounded in previous scholarship,
observation of four distinct Macalester SSMOs provided a practical test of theories on movement
organization. I summarize my results with two central findings: 1) Macalester SSMOs form
concentrically nested, semi-hierarchical organizations based on merit and commitment; and 2)
Macalester SSMO success is likely to correlate with harmony between protest and negotiation
tactics and organizational size and structure.
First, I discovered that horizontality and leaderlessness were both limiting frames to
interpret Macalester SSMOs. These groups orbited flexible, porous leadership. The resulting
shape was not flat, but circular, resonating from the core group. Visualizing the shape of SSMOs
in this way provides a novel way to map organizations that fall somewhere on the spectrum
between hierarchical and totally horizontal. No single theory perfectly encapsulated the specific
type of organizational networks forming at Macalester. Explanations of horizontal movement
structures focus heavily on an SMO’s desire to maintain the label of “leaderlessness” (Ashuri &
Bar-Ilan 2015, Nikiporets-Takigawa 2017, Western 2014). Macalester SSMO participants
identified their organizations as horizontal when prompted to define the group structure. But
participants also acknowledged that individuals played different roles within an organization and
that leaders of one kind or another emerged, such as meeting leaders in the Dream Act
Committee, negotiation leaders during the EEO protests, or core members in FFM. The
prevailing hyperfocus on leaderlessness as an ideal maintained through a facade and not on
movement decentralization and flexibility as a conscious strategy leaves too much of the story
untold. The concentric circle model balances both the need to recognize and evaluate the
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leadership that does exist in these environments, but the flexibility to encapsulate complex
structures of power, not easily named and identified through title.
Second, I found that it is networks in concert with protest and organizing tactics that
ultimately bear most heavily on the success of an SSMO at Macalester. This was most clearly
demonstrated through the variance in result for the EEO protesters and KWOC, where tactics
remained relatively equal but the size of and support received by the organizations were near
opposite. Then, this finding was supported by the success of small, negotiations-based
organization the Dream Act Committee, which demonstrated that broad support wasn’t necessary
when tactics remained centered on negotiation. Future activists should consider this when
developing strategies to organize at Macalester. While many interviewees discussed weighing the
merits of confrontation versus negotiation, none did so in concert with the structure of their
organization itself. This could provide a valuable aid to decision making, as essential to
determining the capacity to carry out an action as finances or time. Participation should be an
active part of the budget.
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Opportunities and Limitations
The existing scholarship on student social movements is limited, and fails to capture the
unique structures and impact of small on-campus organizations. A specific opportunity for
further research comes from an existing fixation on the internet as the nexus of horizontal
organizational structures. At college, while social media plays a role in organizing, it is not the
main forum of interaction between an SSMO and students. Tabling, teach-ins, and in-person
meetings remain the preferred methods of recruitment and organization for Macalester SSMOs.
For example, students could follow FFM on Facebook, but to influence organization decisions or
participate in negotiations with the college, in-person participation was necessary. The structures
seen in the Autonomist Leadership (Western 2014) and NSM models exist outside of the context
of the internet. One possible explanation is that Macalester SSMO organizers learned these
structures from online behaviors or copied from famous NSMs like #BlackLivesMatter. More
likely, concentric circle style SSMOs were perfected through the study of these movements
(KWOC students learning organizing strategies while working on the Occupy Homes movement,
as an example), but formed because that’s what student social movements have looked like for
decades. Dating back to the occupation of 77 Mac in the 1970s, Macalester SSMOs throughout
the decades have adopted much the same structure, not as a response to the internet, but as a
response to the conditions of the college environment.
Hirsch (1990) wrote that student movements were unusual “especially the ability of
organizers to take advantage of the physical concentration of students on campuses” (102). That
is true. While the internet is a useful recruiting and organizing tool, utilized especially by more
contemporary SSMOs like FFM, when students can constantly and conveniently access each
other in person, the primary structure of the SSMO remains offline. This is evident because
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despite access to the internet, organizing continues to be complicated by the physical realities of
college. High student turnover (annual graduation, study abroad, incoming first years) mandates
groups develop leadership structures that are easily changed and don’t rely on the charismatic
leadership or institutional knowledge of one or two students. Fierce competition for the time and
attention of students necessitates creating various levels of involvement for participants and
supporters. The organizational structures Macalester SSMOs have adopted over the years aren’t
responses to the internet; rather, they constitute adaptations to the environment, unique to the
demands of organizing at a college. From a core of volunteer leaders, to a flexible participant
base, to an amorphous, ever-evolving group of supporters and sympathizers, the distinct
networks and structures seen in Macalester SSMOs are a genetic fingerprint. It’s the mark of
years of evolution to suit the demands of the environment.
There’s also a profound need for further study into Macalester SSMOs, SSMOs on small
college campuses in general, and comparative studies between SSMOs on different campuses as
well as between small, one campus SSMOs and regional or national SSMOs. Much of the
prevailing scholarship is interested in national movements and movements of students that may
not necessarily be tied to campus activism. The fact that more than half of the student activist
participants in my study went on to pursue further involvement or a career in organizing,
suggests that former student activists are well-represented in SMOs outside of the college
context. Further study of the patterns of student activism could provide an interesting perspective
on the behavior of SMOs outside of colleges and on the impact of SSMOs on organizing in
general.
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